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ABSTRACT 
According to folk psychology, instrumental music regularly elicits emotions in listeners. Philos-
ophers and psychologists such as Kivy, Konecni and Zangwill have questioned the existence of 
these musically elicited emotions, arguing that instrumental music elicits moods or aesthetic 
judgments rather than emotions. I defend the folk psychological position against these skeptics. 
The first chapter sets up the debate surrounding musically elicited emotions, while chapters two 
and three defend the thesis that instrumental music elicits emotions against the critics’ argu-
ments. Chapter four outlines the implications of this defense for a variety of fields. 
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1. Why musical emotions need defending 
The apparent power of music to elicit emotions in humans has been remarked upon for millen-
nia: as the tenth-century Persian scholar Al-Ghazzali put it, ‘The heart of man has been so consti-
tuted...[that] it contains a hidden fire which is evoked by music and harmony, and renders a man 
beside himself with ecstasy’ (Al-Ghazzali, 1909, p. 73). Nevertheless, the folk-psychological be-
lief that music elicits emotions has been strongly questioned by such philosophers and psycholo-
gists as Kivy (1989, 1999), Konecni (2003, 2008) and Zangwill (2004, 2007). In this thesis I will 
address the arguments raised by these authors and conclude that music does regularly elicit emo-
tions, though a wide range of contextual factors can prevent such elicitation.  
The arguments of these critics can be broadly divided into two groups: a posteriori critiques 
of the existing data in favor of musically elicited emotions [MEE] (Konecni, 2008a), and a priori 
critiques arguing that only moods or purely aesthetic responses, rather than emotions, could in 
principle be elicited by music (Zangwill, 2004).1 These two types of argument are often com-
bined (Kivy, 1999). I will conclude that none of the arguments of these skeptics regarding MEE 
are decisive, though they raise a number of important issues. For example, I argue that the a pos-
teriori critiques made by Konecni (2008a) highlight important methodological traps into which 
researchers have sometimes fallen, though I believe he drastically overstates the impact these 
issues have on the empirical support for MEE. 
                                                
1 By ‘a posteriori critique’ I mean a critique that accepts that MEE are possible, but argues the existing 
evidence is methodologically flawed or somehow insufficient to establish their existence. 
 
By ‘a priori critique’ I mean a critique that argues that music is simply not the sort of thing that could 
elicit genuine emotions: instead, music elicits moods, aesthetic responses etc. 
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Throughout this thesis I will be using ‘music’ as shorthand for ‘instrumental music’. I choose 
to focus on instrumental music firstly because the MEE skeptics have focused exclusively on this 
category, and secondly because instrumental music seems to provide the most interesting cases 
of MEE, as the absence of vocal parts significantly limits the range of possible elicitation mech-
anisms. 
In order to fully address the critiques of Kivy, Konecni and Zangwill I will need to consider 
the psychological mechanisms that may underpin our emotional responses to music. This discus-
sion is necessary due to a distinction that Kivy (1999), Konecni (2008a) and Zangwill (2004) 
draw between direct and indirect elicitation of emotions by music. The details of the distinction 
vary from author to author, but it is essentially meant to exclude ‘indirect’ psychological mecha-
nisms from consideration as sources of MEE. One example of an ‘indirect’ mechanism is 
memory association; critics of MEE argue that when music evokes an episodic memory in the 
listener, any emotion that follows cannot be considered a MEE because it is the memory rather 
than the music that is eliciting the emotion.2 For example, imagine that I hear Bach’s Goldberg 
Variations, which remind me of home, and this memory of home makes me feel nostalgic. Kivy, 
Konecni and Zangwill would say this elicitation is not an instance of MEE. Consequently, they 
argue that experiments must control specifically for episodic memory associations (along with 
other ‘indirect’ mechanisms) if they are to support the existence of MEE. 
I will argue that this binary distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ mechanisms is empiri-
cally unwarranted and question-begging. In order to support these claims I will first outline two 
prominent contemporary theories of the elicitation mechanisms underlying affective responses to 
                                                
2 They accept that ‘indirect’ mechanisms can elicit emotions, but deny that there are any ‘direct’ mecha-
nisms that can do so. 
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music, namely Juslin and Vastfjall (2008) and Huron (2006). Examples of the mechanisms posit-
ed by these theories include musical expectancy (where an affective response is elicited through 
the fulfillment or undermining of our expectations concerning the future course of the music) and 
episodic memory associations (see previous paragraph). I will show that neither of these theories 
supports any clear-cut distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ mechanisms.3 Furthermore, I 
will show that even a charitable interpretation of the direct/indirect distinction [DID] ends up be-
ing highly implausible: consequently, I argue such a distinction is empirically unwarranted. I will 
further argue that the direct/indirect distinction serves solely as a means for MEE skeptics to rule 
out evidence that is unfavorable to their position, and is thus question-begging. 
The main philosophical implication of the thesis will be that the folk-psychological belief in 
MEE is warranted, and that none of the major skeptical arguments regarding MEE are persua-
sive. On the other hand, I will note a number of areas where the evidence in favor of MEE is in 
need of further development; for example, there is a dearth of ecologically valid studies that ex-
amine specific elicitation mechanisms.4 I will also highlight methodological problems surround-
ing investigations of MEE: in particular, I argue that some prominent studies (e.g., Krumhansl, 
1997) have consistently conflated the expression and elicitation of emotion by music, thereby 
contaminating the data generated by these studies. These issues are relevant, as they partially 
vindicate the a posteriori critiques offered by Konecni (2008a). 
                                                
3 I will focus on these two theories because they are both especially prominent in the literature. While it 
might be preferable to survey a wider range of theories, to my knowledge no major existing theory sup-
ports a clear distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ mechanisms. 
4 A study is ecologically valid when its finding can be generalized to naturally occurring circumstances. 
For example, an ecologically valid study might use methods, materials and setting roughly approximating 
the real-life situation under investigation. 
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The thesis is novel insofar as it presents a detailed response to the skeptical claims of Kivy, 
Konecni and Zangwill. The few existing responses to these authors have failed to appreciate the 
range of arguments supporting their positions, thereby neglecting the insights that can be found 
therein. The question of whether MEE exist is significant because if they do not exist, then folk 
psychology is in error on this point, and if they do exist, then instrumental music could prove 
useful as a means of reliably eliciting emotions under experimental conditions.5 This elicitation 
method would be of particular interest to researchers investigating emotions such as happiness 
and sadness that are hard to reliably elicit under laboratory conditions (Koelsch et al., 2006). The 
existence of MEE would also be of theoretical interest, as it would suggest the existence of non-
linguistic and possibly primitive emotion elicitation mechanisms that any satisfactory theory of 
emotions should be able to account for. 
The structure of the thesis will be as follows: in Chapter 2 I will address the a priori argu-
ments of the MEE skeptics. In Section 2.1 I will outline three contemporary theories of emotion, 
as well as discussing the distinction between moods and emotion. I will then present two promi-
nent frameworks for categorizing the mechanisms underpinning MEE in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
These frameworks will then be used to support my criticisms of the direct/indirect distinction in 
Section 2.4. The remaining a priori arguments against MEE will be addressed in Sections 2.5 
and 2.6. These critiques center on the idea that emotions essentially involve particular types of 
judgment or behavioral dispositions (e.g., crying when you are sad), which the skeptics claim are 
                                                
5 The experimental use of MEE would require the identification of strong causal links between specific 
pieces or musical forms and particular emotions. These causal links would have to be both reliable and 
relatively context-insensitive in order to prove experimentally useful. There is, of course, no guarantee 
that such links will be found, but numerous MEE researchers have raised this as a realistic possibility. 
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absent in MEE. I will respond by arguing that (1) emotions do not essentially involve these fea-
tures, and (2) there is evidence that MEE can in fact possess these features. 
 Chapter 3 will deal with a posteriori critiques of MEE. I will begin by giving a brief re-
view of the relevant empirical literature (Sections 3.1 – 3.3). The purpose of this review is to 
suggest that whichever theory of emotion we endorse, there is empirical evidence that gives us 
good reason to posit the existence of MEE. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5 I will address Kivy’s and 
Konecni’s a posteriori arguments against MEE, focusing in particular on Konecni’s methodolog-
ical critiques of the contemporary MEE literature. Finally, Chapter 4 will outline the implications 
of this thesis for a range of fields, as well as highlighting fruitful avenues for further research. 
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2. Laying the foundations for musical emotions 
Kivy (1989, 1999), Konecni (2003, 2008) and Zangwill (2004, 2007) all offer a priori critiques 
of MEE. In this chapter I will respond to these critiques, and highlight some problematic as-
sumptions shared by several of them. More specifically, I will call into question the distinction 
that all three authors draw between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ elicitation mechanisms. As anticipated 
in the previous chapter, I will make the case that DID is empirically unwarranted and question-
begging. 
 In order to respond effectively to these a priori critiques and show DID to be empirically 
unwarranted, it will first be necessary to have a sense of how several major theories define emo-
tions, as well as how we might distinguish between emotions and moods, and what the mecha-
nisms underlying MEE might be. To this end, in Section 2.1 I will outline three contemporary 
theories of emotion, as well as broadly defining emotions, moods and affective states. In Section 
2.2 I will briefly outline two major theoretical accounts of the mechanisms underlying the elicita-
tion of emotions by instrumental music, namely Juslin and Vastfyall (2008) and Huron (2006). 
The conclusions drawn in this thesis will not be dependent on the details of either theory: they 
serve primarily to suggest (1) that any comprehensive theory of MEE will need to posit multiple 
elicitation mechanisms, and (2) that no clear DID can be drawn within the framework of these 
theories. 
2.1 Identifying Emotions  
The terms ‘emotion’, ‘mood’ and ‘affective response’ are rarely defined in the MEE liter-
ature (Juslin & Sloboda, 2010). Even when definitions are offered, they tend to be very impre-
cise. Furthermore, the definitions offered by MEE defenders and skeptics often vary: these varia-
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tions can bog down discussions and obfuscate the points of disagreement. In an attempt to avoid 
these difficulties, I will now provide a brief overview of several major contemporary theories of 
emotion. This overview will serve two purposes. Firstly, it will lay the groundwork for my re-
sponses to the a priori arguments made by MEE skeptics. For example, I argue that some of 
Kivy’s a priori arguments rely heavily on a naïve form of cognitivism. In order to make sense of 
this criticism, we need a clear understanding of cognitivism and its rivals. Secondly, the theories 
outlined here will shape my survey of the empirical MEE literature in Chapter 3. More specifi-
cally, Chapter 3 will provide empirical evidence that should prove persuasive to most of the the-
ories outlined here, with the possible exception of cognitivism.6 
A typical emotional response has several components. These include thoughts (e.g., the 
belief that I have just won a prize), feelings (e.g., a deep sense of contentment), physiological 
changes (e.g., increased heart rate and changes in facial expression) and behaviors (e.g., cheer-
ing). One of the primary tasks of a theory of emotion is to tell us which of these components, or 
which combination of them, is the emotion. Further questions concern the causal relations be-
tween these components: which come first, and are any of them necessary or sufficient for the 
occurrence of an emotion? There is substantial disagreement on all of these questions, and I will 
not be attempting to resolve it in this thesis. Instead, I will outline the answers given by three 
prominent theories of emotion: (1) the James-Lange theory, (2) basic emotion theories and (3) 
cognitivist theories. 
A supporter of the James-Lange theory of emotion holds that ‘we are sad because we 
cry’: physiological responses are the causal drivers of our emotions (James, 1884). This claim 
stands in stark contrast to our everyday view of emotions, according to which physiological 
                                                
6 See Section 4.4 for a more detailed discussion of the implications of this thesis for cognitivism. 
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changes are caused by mental changes (e.g. feeling afraid causes me to tremble). While James 
held that physiological changes were the causal drivers of emotion, he acknowledged the exist-
ence of other components of emotional responses such as behavioral dispositions (e.g. running 
away when frightened). On a James-Lange view, I can be frightened even if there is no specific 
thought causing my fear. For example, my fear might be elicited extremely rapidly, leaving no 
time for neocortical involvement (LeDoux, 1996). 
If we wish to convince a James-Lange theorist that MEE exist, we need to provide evi-
dence that physiological changes indicative of emotion can be caused by music. While there may 
be no precise physiological ‘signature’ for every emotion, we can specify suites of physiological 
responses that accompany prototypical episodes of a particular emotion. For example, James 
mentions ‘quickened heart-beats’, ‘shallow breathing’, ‘trembling lips’, ‘weakened limbs’ and 
‘goose-flesh’ as physiological responses indicative of fear (James, 1884, p. 194).7 In section 3.3 I 
survey the evidence suggesting that these changes do in fact occur, including landmark papers 
such as Krumhansl (1997). Despite its many critics, the James-Lange theory remains highly in-
fluential: it has inspired a wave of ‘Neo-Jamesian’ theories of emotion such as Damasio (2003) 
and Prinz (2004). 
‘Basic emotions’ theory states that emotions such as anger, fear and surprise are universal 
among humans. Ekman (2003) argues that basic emotions are complex, evolutionarily driven re-
sponses to types of environmental situations: he refers to these responses as ‘affect programs’. 
Affect programs co-ordinate behavioral, physiological and cognitive changes. Since these pro-
grams were adaptive in part due to their communicative function, Ekman argues that they are 
each associated with distinctive facial expressions that can be recognized cross-culturally. Fur-
                                                
7 On the other hand, some theorists have suggested that states of physiological arousal must be cognitively 
‘labeled’ in order to qualify as a particular emotion (cf. Schachter and Singer, 1962). 
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thermore, the duration of the basic emotions is measured ‘not [in] hours or days, but more in the 
realm of minutes or seconds’, and their onset is rapid (Ekman, 1984, p. 16). The number of basic 
emotions posited by Ekman has grown over time, from six (Ekman, 1984) to fifteen (Ekman, 
1999). Furthermore, Ekman has argued that there are no non-basic emotions (Ekman, 1999, p. 
57). 
A basic emotions theorist would argue that we could investigate the existence of MEE by 
testing for the presence of prototypical facial expressions while subjects are listening to instru-
mental music, as the expressions are culturally invariant and relatively easy to measure. In sec-
tion 3.3 I discuss the work of Witvliet and Vrana (1996) who find compelling evidence of just 
such facial expressions using electromyography (EMG). 
Finally, cognitivist theories such as Nussbaum (2001) and Solomon (2003) hold that 
emotions are judgments of a certain kind. For example, sadness might be defined as the judg-
ment that I have suffered an irrevocable loss. The precise formulation of the cognitivist thesis 
varies from author to author: for example, Nussbaum (2001) defines emotions as ‘appraisals or 
value judgments’ (p. 4). Furthermore, there is substantial disagreement about whether these 
judgments have to be consciously accessible.8 Lastly, authors such Scarantino (2010) have iden-
tified three different ‘varieties’ of cognitivism: I will be concerning myself solely with constitu-
tive and etiological cognitivism.9 Overall, while the details of cognitivist theories vary, what 
unites them is an insistence that emotions require judgments: in the absence of the relevant kind 
of judgment, there can be no emotion. 
                                                
8 This point will be further explored in Section 2.5. 
9 A constitutive cognitivist claims that emotions are constituted by judgments of a particular sort, while an 
etiological cognitivist claims that emotions are caused by such judgments. 
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In addition to these basic types of emotion theory, there are many ‘hybrid theories’ that 
identify an emotion with some combination of the aforementioned components (Prinz, 2004, p. 
10). For example, a ‘somatic feeling’ theory holds that emotions are feelings, but that these feel-
ings are responses to bodily changes (ibid.). The somatic feeling theory claims that both feelings 
and physiological changes are essential to emotion, making it a hybrid theory. Outlining all ma-
jor hybrid theories lies beyond the scope of this thesis: instead, I will provide evidence that mu-
sic regularly elicits feelings, physiological changes and neurological activity typical of a range of 
emotions. This wide range of evidence should prove persuasive to a variety of hybrid theories. 
Having laid out a range of theories of emotion, we might wonder what the relationship is 
between emotions, moods and affective responses. Unfortunately there is little consensus on this 
question. Some authors view emotions and moods as distinct subsets of affective responses 
(Juslin & Vastfyall, 2008), while others view moods as subsets of emotions (Prinz, 2004). I will 
opt for the former categorization, as it is more prevalent within the MEE literature (Juslin & Slo-
boda, 2010, p. 10).  
Sizer (2000) provides a useful framework for understanding the distinction between 
moods and emotions. She argues that moods and emotions lie on a spectrum of affective re-
sponses, but maintains that moods are quite different from paradigmatic emotions and thus can-
not be explained merely by ‘stretching’ our existing theories of emotion. She characterizes 
moods as ‘generalized, nonspecific affective states like melancholy, ennui or ebullience’ (Sizer, 
2000, p. 2). For example, when I am melancholic my mood does not have any determinate ob-
ject: instead, it permeates my perceptions, thoughts and desires, making the whole world seem 
‘greyer, duller, less livable’ (Haugeland, 1978, p. 223).  
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Moods thus understood stand in contrast to emotions, which typically have specifiable 
objects. For example, when I am scared of a snake, the object of my fear is the snake, not the 
world in general. Emotions are also more likely to be subject to cognitive influence (i.e. they are 
more cognitively penetrable).10 For example, if I find out that the ‘snake’ is in fact a garden hose, 
my fear will typically subside. Alternatively, if I am knowledgeable about snakes and realize that 
the snake in question is docile and harmless, then this realization will dissipate my fear. A further 
contrast that is widely accepted in the MEE literature is that emotions tend to be briefer and more 
intense than moods (Juslin & Sloboda, 2010, p. 10). 
While these working definitions are undoubtedly contentious, they can at least provide us 
with a shared starting-point for a discussion of MEE and help to avoid some terminological con-
fusion. I will be focusing solely on music’s potential to elicit emotions: if Sizer is right in argu-
ing that moods and emotions are distinct phenomena, then it remains an open question whether 
music can also elicit moods. Furthermore, I will not be committing myself to the truth of any 
particular theory of emotions: I will argue that the empirical evidence provided in Chapter 3 
should prove persuasive to a range of theories (see Section 3.1 for further details). 
 
2.2 A taxonomy of elicitation mechanisms – Juslin & Vastfyall’s 7-part theory 
Juslin and Vastfyall (2008) posit the existence of seven distinct elicitation mechanisms for MEE. 
11 These mechanisms are not meant to be mutually exclusive: several of them can be active in 
any given case of emotion elicitation. Furthermore, the same emotion (e.g., happiness) can be 
                                                
10 A process is cognitively penetrable if ‘its performance depends on and is explained in virtue of what the 
system represents (the beliefs, goals, and knowledge of the agent)’ (Sizer, 2000, p. 15). 
11 Juslin & Vastfyall’s working definitions of emotions and moods are very similar to the definitions out-
lined in Section 2.1 (Juslin & Vastfyall, 2008, p. 3). 
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elicited by different mechanisms on different occasions. These mechanisms are not meant to be 
music-specific: all of them can be observed in other contexts. Finally, the mechanisms vary 
widely in terms of their evolutionary function, speed, availability to consciousness, and underly-
ing neural activation patterns. The following sections contain brief summaries of the mechanisms 
of emotion elicitation by music posited by Juslin and Vastfyall. 
Brain stem reflex 
A ‘brain stem reflex’ occurs when one or more of the acoustic properties of the music are inter-
preted by the brain as signaling a potentially important and urgent event (Juslin & Vastfyall, 
2008, p. 6). Music (or even an isolated sound) that is sudden, loud or dissonant will, ceteris pari-
bus, induce a negative affective response in the listener.12 For example, the loud dissonant chords 
in Part 1, Scene 2 of Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring might give rise to this type of response. The 
negative affect will typically be accompanied by physiological changes such as increased heart 
rate and activation of the sympathetic nervous system. For example, if I am sitting at my desk 
drinking a cup of tea and hear a sudden bang behind me, this mechanism would be activated, and 
I would be startled.  
This mechanism operates relatively rapidly and appears to be culturally invariant. While 
the details of this mechanism’s neural underpinnings are not fully understood, there is evidence 
that responses to dissonance may recruit both paralimbic structures and auditory cortex, making 
the label ‘brain stem reflex’ somewhat inaccurate. The paralimbic structures seem to be involved 
with affective responses to dissonance (Blood et al., 1999; Koelsch et al., 2006), while the audi-
                                                
12 An alternative explanation of this mechanism given by Huron (2006) is simply that loud or sudden 
sounds are unexpected, and it is their unexpectedness that causes what he calls a negative ‘reaction re-
sponse’.  
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tory cortex plays a role in the perceptual analysis of dissonance (Blood et al., 1999; Peretz et al., 
2001). Consequently, lesions in auditory cortex will result in a deficit in dissonance perception 
without preventing its emotional processing, as seen in the case of patient IR (Peretz et al., 
2001). By contrast, lesions in paralimbic regions result in indifference to dissonance despite its 
intact perception. 
Evaluative conditioning 
Evaluative conditioning occurs when an emotion is elicited by a piece of music because the mu-
sical stimulus has regularly been paired with another positively or negatively valenced stimulus. 
Effectively, this situation is a case of classical conditioning where the conditioned stimulus is a 
piece of music. For example, I often listen to a particular piece of music while walking through 
my favorite park: over time, the music may become able to elicit happiness even in the absence 
of the park. Conditioning can occur without any conscious awareness of the repeated juxtaposi-
tion of the stimuli (Martin et al., 1984). Since we regularly encounter musical stimuli in situa-
tions where music listening is not the focus of our activity (e.g., in elevators or shops), Juslin and 
Vastfyall hypothesize that evaluative conditioning could be a relatively common elicitation 
mechanism.13 
Emotional contagion 
Emotional contagion occurs when a listener perceives a piece of music to be expressing an emo-
tion and ‘mimics’ the expressed emotion. This mimicking has been regularly observed in cases 
involving emotionally charged speech, also known as affective prosody (Kallinen & Rajava, 
                                                
13 For a more detailed examination of background music’s influence on emotions in a retail environment, 
see Bruner (1990). 
How music makes us feel                  14 
2006). Juslin and Vastfyall hypothesize that the perceived expressiveness of music stems partly 
from featuring sound patterns similar to those found in affective prosody. For example, when we 
are sad the tempo, pitch and volume of our speech typically decrease: thus, music that also pos-
sesses these properties (e.g., Barber’s Adagio in G Minor) might activate this mechanism. In a 
similar vein, Juslin (1991) argues for the existence of a neural ‘module’ that responds automati-
cally to these speech-like features, causing us to mimic the perceived emotion. Koelsch et al. 
(2006) provide neurological evidence that broadly supports the existence of such a mimicking 
mechanism; for a contrary viewpoint see Simpson, Oliver and Fragaszy (2008). While the empir-
ical evidence in support of this mechanism is comparatively weak, nothing significant hangs on 
its existence—I have included it primarily for the sake of completeness. 
Visual imagery 
Hearing a piece of music may cause a listener to imagine a mental image (e.g., of a scenic land-
scape): this mental image may in turn elicit an emotional response. For example, I might respond 
with happiness to an imagined vista of rolling fields, just as I would in reality. While this type of 
elicitation may seem odd (why should music prompt these feats of visual imagination?), the evi-
dence for such a mechanism is compelling. For example, the use of visual imagery for emotion 
elicitation plays a vital role in many forms of music therapy such as the Guided Imagery and 
Music method developed by Bonny (2002). Visual imagery is an unusual mechanism due to the 
relatively high degree of control that the listener has over the process: I can in most cases strong-
ly influence what kind of imagery, if any, a piece of music stirs up in my mind. It should be not-
ed that Konecni and other MEE critics are skeptical about the capacity of music to elicit visual 
imagery, however nothing hangs on the existence of this specific elicitation mechanism. 
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Episodic memory 
Hearing a piece of music may evoke a memory of a specific event in a listener’s life: this 
memory may then elicit a whole range of emotions through a process of association.14 For exam-
ple, hearing the theme tune to ‘University Challenge’ reminds me of a very positive experience, 
and that memory makes me happy and rather nostalgic.15 This process of memory elicitation 
through music has become known as the ‘Darling, they are playing our tune’ phenomenon (Da-
vies, 1978). Some associations are widely shared: for example, hearing ‘Happy Birthday’ might 
prompt many people to think of a childhood birthday party. The associations can be more idio-
syncratic, as in the case of hearing a song that reminds me of a favorite book. Janata, Tomic and 
Rakowski (2007) provide strong empirical evidence for this mechanism.  
At this point we might wonder why MEE would be at all surprising or controversial if we 
already accept that music can elicit episodic memories. The MEE skeptic’s response would be to 
appeal to DID. They would accept that episodic memories are evoked by music, and that these 
memories can elicit emotions: nevertheless, they would claim that this mechanism involves indi-
rect elicitation, and that consequently we cannot count any elicited emotion as an example of 
MEE. In other words, they claim that it is the memory, not the music, that is really doing the 
causal work in such cases. I will present my arguments against DID in Section 2.3. 
 
 
                                                
14 The mechanism that enables me to recall autobiographical events is known as episodic memory. 
15 ‘University Challenge’ is a British quiz show. 
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Musical expectancy 
When we listen to music, we constantly form expectations about how the music will progress. 
We may have expectations about what will happen next (e.g., chord progressions) and when it 
will happen (e.g., on what beat in the bar a particular transition will occur). These expectations 
vary in strength, and we can have several competing sets of expectations at once. For example, if 
I hear an E followed by an F#, I will expect the next note to be G#.16 If the next note is a G rather 
than a G#, my expectations will be violated and I will feel surprised or even distressed. Meyer 
(1956) highlighted the importance of musical expectancy for emotion elicitation, and studies 
such as Steinbeis et al. (2006) have found evidence in support of Meyer’s theory using self-
reports and physiological measures of emotion in response to unexpected musical events.17 Hu-
ron (2006) has developed the theoretical underpinnings of musical expectancy as well as collect-
ing a much wider range of supporting evidence: Huron’s ITPRA theory will be discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
Cognitive Appraisal 
Occasionally a piece of music is relevant to my current goals, plans or well-being: when I ap-
praise the music as being relevant in this way, I may feel an emotion. For example, if I’m trying 
to get to sleep and my neighbors are playing very loud music, the music prevents me from 
achieving my goal of getting to sleep. Consequently, the music may make me feel angry or sad. 
In this type of case the music could easily be replaced with another stimulus: for example, my 
                                                
16 This assumes that I’m minimally familiar with Western musical styles: if my musical experiences were 
largely confined to a culture that uses different scales I would form different expectations. 
17 For a more detailed discussion of the role that physiological evidence plays in identifying emotions, see 
Section 3.3. 
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neighbors talking loudly or moving furniture around would elicit the same emotional response, 
since that too would stop me getting to sleep. According to Juslin and Vastfyall, this elicitation 
mechanism is relatively rare, since music is not typically goal-relevant in this way. 
2.3 The power of expectation – Huron’s ‘ITPRA’ theory 
David Huron (2006) provides a comprehensive and empirically well-grounded theory of musical 
expectation. In doing so, he develops a more general theory of expectation that he calls ITPRA. 
ITPRA stands for ‘Imagination, Tension, Prediction, Reaction, Appraisal’. Huron argues that 
some, but by no means all, musically elicited emotions can be explained in terms of musical ex-
pectation. In the following section I will briefly describe the five components of ITPRA and 
highlight how Huron’s theory might supplement the framework suggested by Juslin and Vastfy-
all (2008).  
 Huron argues that the psychological phenomenon of expectation, and the emotional re-
sponses that often accompany it, is the cumulative result of five distinct underlying processes, 
each with different evolutionary origins, neural underpinnings and time courses. The Imagination 
and Tension processes can be understood as ‘pre-outcome’: they take place prior to the occur-
rence of the expected stimulus. By contrast, the Prediction, Reaction and Appraisal processes are 
‘post-outcome’ responses to the accuracy of our expectations. All of these processes have some 
degree of valence, though these valences can vary independently. 
Imagination 
Humans often try to predict the future. For example, we try to predict how a person will behave, 
how an object will move, or what the weather will be like this afternoon. In such cases we may 
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imagine a variety of possible outcomes and select one as being most likely, thereby forming an 
expectation. Sometimes these expectations are conscious and highly deliberative, such as when 
I’m trying to predict how my committee will respond to a particular example in my thesis. By 
contrast, other expectations are largely unconscious and automatic, such as when I predict the 
future motion of a ball in flight in order to catch it.  
 According to Huron, our expectations about the course of a piece of music are largely of 
the latter kind; he describes them as ‘automatic, ubiquitous and (mostly) unconscious’ (Huron, 
2006, p. 358). Forming accurate expectations is evolutionarily adaptive; correctly predicting the 
future improves perception and facilitates rapid and effective motor responses.18 Accurate expec-
tations enable us to tailor our actions to facilitate our long-term goals: if I can anticipate future 
events, I can plan much more effectively. Huron marshals a wealth of empirical evidence to ar-
gue that our minds form expectations about stimuli even when said stimuli are relatively unim-
portant for survival, as tends to be the case with music. 
 These expectations pack significant affective punch; when I imagine a positive future 
event such as defending my thesis, I feel an anticipatory sense of happiness that motivates me to 
pursue this goal (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Damasio (1994) provides evidence for the im-
portance of these anticipatory emotions. He describes a condition in which patients no longer 
experience the feelings associated with possible future outcomes. For example, Damasio’s pa-
tient ‘Elliot’ was capable of feeling emotion in response to an experienced event and could accu-
rately predict the likely outcomes of his actions, yet was unable to ‘preview’ the emotions that 
would accompany future positive or negative outcomes. The rather startling consequence of El-
                                                
18 Humans perceive a stimulus more rapidly and accurately when it is expected rather than surprising. 
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liot’s condition was that he consistently failed to take action to avoid negative outcomes, because 
they had lost their motivational force. As Huron puts it, ‘we do not simply think about future 
possibilities; we feel future possibilities’ (Huron, 2006, p. 9). 
Tension 
Once we have formed an expectation about the future, we attempt to prepare for the expected 
event(s). This preparation can generate a tension response. For example, if I see a friend standing 
in front of me with a balloon in one hand, a pin in the other and a mischievous grin on her face, I 
will form an expectation that she’s about to pop the balloon. In response to this expectation I will 
shut my eyes, cover my ears and turn my face away. In such cases I have a strong expectation 
about what will happen, but a degree of uncertainty about when it will happen. By contrast, if I 
am a fielder in a cricket game, as the bowler begins his run-up I will tense my muscles, my heart 
rate and blood pressure will increase and my breathing will deepen.19 In such a scenario I am rel-
atively sure about the timing of future events, but am very uncertain about what will happen. 
This type of physiological and motor preparation consumes significant amounts of energy, which 
is why a fielder in cricket or baseball might be exhausted at the end of a match even if she has 
not been required to move at all. Huron argues that these fluctuations in physiological arousal 
can in turn generate or influence affective responses.20 
 
                                                
19 Regular cricket-watchers may be skeptical of such claims; readers should feel free to substitute a sport 
that requires greater athleticism. 
20 By making this claim Huron seems to be endorsing some variant of a James-Lange theory of emotions 
(i.e., a theory according to which physiological changes can cause affective responses). For the purposes 
of this thesis, nothing hangs on whether he is correct on this point. 
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Prediction 
Forming accurate expectations about the future is typically beneficial to an organism, while 
faulty expectations are typically harmful. Consequently, it would seem adaptive for there to be 
some psychological weal or woe that occurs in response to the accuracy of these expectations. 
For example, I may expect that it will rain tomorrow when I’m hoping to play tennis. In the 
event that it does actually rain, my sadness at being unable to play tennis will be tinged with sat-
isfaction at having correctly anticipated the miserable weather. This affective response to the ac-
curacy of my expectations is what Huron dubs the Prediction response. When my expectations 
prove accurate, the prediction response is positively valenced and vice versa. Huron regards this 
aspect of the expectation process as particularly crucial and under-recognized. To take a musical 
example, when I correctly anticipate the course of a piece of music, the ensuing prediction re-
sponse will be positive. This positive affect is often misattributed to the music (i.e., I believe it’s 
the music itself that has generated the affect rather than the successful prediction). 
Reaction 
In addition to responding to the accuracy of our prior expectations, once an outcome is known 
we can react affectively to the outcome itself. For example, I might experience fear when I en-
counter an angry dog, happiness when meeting an old friend, etc.. Huron draws on the work of 
LeDoux (1998) and others to argue that there are two distinct processes underlying these emo-
tional reactions. The first of these involves a ‘quick and dirty’ assessment of the significance of 
an outcome, while the second is a more thoughtful appraisal. Huron labels these the ‘Reaction’ 
and ‘Appraisal’ responses. These responses can elicit contrasting emotions. For example, if I en-
ter a surprise birthday party, then I may initially feel a sense of shock or fear upon encountering 
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this large group of people unexpectedly (the ‘reaction’ response), followed by happiness or joy 
once I realize that the people are my friends (the ‘appraisal’ response). 
According to Huron, the reaction response exhibits three central features that distinguish it 
from the appraisal response. Firstly, the reaction response is fast, typically beginning ~150ms 
after the event, though physiological changes such as increased heart rate may persist for some 
time. Secondly, it is not mediated by consciousness: as cases of blindfright show, I can exhibit 
fear responses to a stimulus that I do not consciously perceive.21 Lastly, it is defensive or protec-
tive in function, in the sense that it assumes a worst-case scenario and responds accordingly. A 
reflex is an example of a reaction response in a non-emotional context: when I touch a hot stove 
my hand is immediately withdrawn, and this is controlled via a reflex arc that excludes the brain. 
This reflex exhibits all three of the features indicated by Huron.  
On the other hand, not all reaction responses are reflexes, as some are learnt rather than in-
stinctive. For example, consider a sentence incorrect that grammatically is. Upon reading such a 
sentence, we will tend to feel a sense of surprise: this surprise is a reaction response in Huron’s 
sense, yet it results from the unexpected violation of a learned schema, namely the rules of Eng-
lish grammar. In the case of music, over time we form schemas at various levels of detail that are 
roughly analogous to the vocabulary and grammar of a language (Huron, 2006, p. 92). When 
these schemas are violated, it provokes a negative reaction response. 
 
                                                
21 In cases of ‘blindfright’, subjects are shown an image of a typically fear-causing stimulus (e.g., a spi-
der), but the image is masked (i.e., shown very briefly) so that the subject has no conscious awareness of 
seeing the image (cf. Scarantino 2010). Despite this lack of conscious awareness of the stimulus, subjects 
exhibit physiological and neurological responses (e.g., increased skin conductance, startle reflexes and 
differential amygdala activation) that are strongly indicative of fear. 
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Appraisal 
Following the reaction response, we may diminish, augment or revise our initial response to an 
event through a process of conscious reflection upon its significance. For example, in the case of 
the surprise party mentioned above, my feeling of fear would be supplanted by happiness as I 
assess the situation and realize that I am surrounded by friends. This slower and more delibera-
tive affective response is what Huron calls the Appraisal response. By contrast with the reaction 
response, appraisals are relatively slow, mediated by consciousness and typically arrive at a more 
accurate assessment of an event’s significance, rather than being ’defensive’ like the reaction re-
sponse.22 
Reconciling Huron with Juslin and Vastfyall 
Having outlined Huron’s ITPRA theory, we might wonder how it relates to the 7-part theory ad-
vocated by Juslin and Vastfyall (2008). Should they be understood as competing theories, as 
complementary components of a larger theory, or as completely independent? It seems clear that, 
at the very least, they are not competitors: while Juslin and Vastfyall are attempting to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying musically 
elicited emotions, Huron makes no such claim. Indeed, Huron explicitly notes that ‘music can 
also evoke emotions through many other means—apart from whether sounds are expected or 
not’ (Huron, 2006, p. 365).  
                                                
22 It is important to note that Huron’s use of ‘appraisal’ differs from the usage of the term by emotion the-
orists. For example, Huron’s appraisals are always conscious, whereas this is not necessarily the case ac-
cording to emotion theorists. 
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 Perhaps the most helpful way to understand the connection between the two theories out-
lined above is as complementary components of a broader theory of MEE. More specifically, 
Juslin and Vastfyall provide a wide-ranging survey of the mechanisms that may underpin MEE, 
while Huron goes into greater depth regarding one of those mechanisms, namely expectancy. 
Juslin and Vastfyall certainly seem favorably disposed towards Huron’s ITPRA theory, stating 
that it is ‘interesting, original and laudable’ (Juslin & Vastfyall, 2008, p. 604). Their sole worry 
is that Huron might be trying to fit too much under the heading of musical expectancy, but this 
concern seems relatively minor. Consequently, when using these theoretical resources to address 
a priori critiques of MEE I will treat them as being largely consistent with one another.  
The main conclusion I will use these theories to support is that no clear or useful distinc-
tion can be drawn between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ elicitation mechanisms. Indeed, Huron and 
Juslin and Vastfyall both seem to reject any such distinction (Juslin & Vastfyall, 2008, p. 605). 
Thus, it is to DID that I shall now turn. 
2.4 But where are the appraisals? – Konecni’s a priori critiques 
In the previous sections of this chapter I outlined two prominent theoretical frameworks for un-
derstanding the mechanisms that underlie MEE. I will now use these frameworks to support my 
critiques of DID. My focus will be on Konecni (2003, 2008a, 2008b), as he provides the most 
detailed and persuasive formulation of this distinction. 
Konecni (2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) holds that music does not directly elicit emotions. In-
stead, he argues that music can elicit emotions only through non-musical intermediaries such as 
memory associations and visual imagery. For example, Konecni (2008b) argues that ‘if these 
nonmusical mediators...were to be kept constant, there would be no effect of music on emotion’ 
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(p. 583). Similarly, Konecni (2008a) maintains that ‘for music to produce emotions, its effects 
must be cognitively mediated by memories and associations regarding powerful real-world 
events’ (p. 123). Without these mediators, Konecni thinks that only moods and quasi-emotions 
such as ‘frisson’ can be elicited by music.23 He draws a distinction between direct and indirect 
mechanisms and holds that only indirect mechanisms can elicit genuine emotions. 
Konecni’s opposition to ‘direct’ elicitation of emotion by music is based on the claim that di-
rectly elicited MEE lack an essential feature of emotions, namely a cognitive appraisal.24 For ex-
ample, when I am afraid, Konecni holds that I must have formed a judgment or appraisal that the 
object of my fear is in some way threatening: without such an appraisal, I am not really feeling 
fear. This emphasis on the necessity of appraisals is the defining feature of cognitivist theories of 
emotion. Konecni clearly states that he endorses such a theory, saying that ‘major, perhaps dom-
inant, emotion theories emphasize appraisal’ (Konecni, 2008b, p. 582). While describing cogni-
tivist theories as ‘dominant’ might be contentious, Konecni also conflates ‘cognitivist theories of 
emotion’ with ‘scientific theories of emotion’ (Konecni, 2003, p. 334). By doing this, Konecni 
suggests that while MEE might exist given a ‘folk’ conception of the emotions, a robustly scien-
tific understanding of the emotions would rule them out. 
This labeling of non-cognitivist theories of emotion as unscientific is controversial: cogni-
tivism is by no means the only viable theory of emotion in the contemporary literature, and thus 
Konecni cannot simply take its truth for granted. Of course, if cognitivism turns out to be true 
                                                
23 Frisson can be roughly characterized as positive subjective affect accompanied by piloerection (also 
known as goosebumps).  
24 Konecni accepts that such appraisals might very occasionally be present (e.g., when loud music is pre-
venting me from sleeping), but argues that in such cases the appraisal is what is doing the causal work, 
thus making the elicitation ‘indirect’.  
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then it may pose a problem for some types of MEE, but as Konecni himself correctly notes, ‘one 
must, of course, be careful not to rule out the possibility of a phenomenon or relationship by def-
initional fiat’ (Konecni, 2003, p. 332). Indeed, it would seem viable to argue that MEE provide a 
possible counter-example to cognitivist theories of emotion given the wealth of empirical evi-
dence supporting their categorization as emotions.25 A summary of this empirical evidence is 
provided in the next chapter. For now, I will critically examine Konecni’s foremost tool for argu-
ing against MEE, namely DID. 
The Direct/Indirect Distinction [DID] 
Konecni’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ elicitation mechanisms is problematic 
for a number of reasons. I argue that DID lacks empirical support and is used by MEE skeptics in 
a manner that is question-begging. On the empirical side, it is important to note first of all that 
neither of the leading accounts of MEE discussed in this thesis utilize DID, nor does it seem they 
could be made to accommodate it. Indeed, Juslin and Vastfyall (2008) specifically reject 
Konecni’s use of DID, arguing that ‘this distinction does not make sense in the current frame-
work (and probably not in any other framework either)’ (p. 605). They note that all emotion 
elicitation mechanisms involve some information processing, and thus might be considered ‘indi-
rect’, depending on how we cache out DID. In other words, the notion of a ‘direct’ mechanism is 
under-specified by Konecni and thus could be fleshed out in a wide variety of ways. Since 
Konecni never provides a definition of what makes a mechanism ‘direct’, it is extremely hard to 
ascertain the criteria that underlie the distinction. We might attempt instead to infer the details of 
DID from the examples used by Konecni: for example, he holds that episodic memory associa-
                                                
25 See Section 4.3 for further details. 
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tions are a paradigmatic case of an indirect mechanism. By contrast, he thinks that Juslin and 
Vastfyall’s ‘brain stem reflex’ would be a direct mechanism. 
Given these examples, a charitable reading of DID might be explicated in terms of different 
types of information processing. For example, ‘indirect’ mechanisms might be those that are me-
diated by consciousness.26 This reading does, at least, fit well with the examples mentioned 
above: for example, brain stem reflexes would count as direct due to their unconscious pro-
cessing. Unfortunately, this more detailed definition runs into major difficulties. Given this defi-
nition, it’s unclear whether musical expectancy would be considered ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’, as the 
degree of conscious accessibility and control varies widely depending on the set of expectations 
in question (see Section 2.2). Konecni tries to get around this possibility by declaring that ‘there 
are no rational grounds’ to hypothesize that musical expectancy can elicit emotions, but he pro-
vides no evidence for this claim (Konecni, 2008b, p. 583).  
Juslin and Vastfyall’s ‘cognitive appraisal’ mechanism seems to generate still further prob-
lems for DID thus construed: indeed, Konecni himself can be read as arguing that it is ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’ given this interpretation of DID. Konecni (2008a) holds that the cognitive apprais-
als required for emotion elicitation can be ‘largely performed at an unconscious level’ (p. 118): 
thus, they would be direct according to our charitable interpretation of DID. On the other hand, 
Konecni (2008b) and Kivy (1999) hold that cognitive appraisals are a clear example of an indi-
rect mechanism. Thus, it seems that cognitive appraisals have the potential to be both direct and 
indirect: since the purpose of DID is to split elicitation mechanisms neatly into two camps, this 
seems to pose a serious problem for its proponents. 
                                                
26 It’s worth noting again that neither Konecni, Kivy nor Zangwill go into detail about how direct and in-
direct mechanisms are to be distinguished: presumably they consider it intuitively obvious. 
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While there may be some other interpretation of DID that avoids these issues, this seems a 
faint hope given that (1) none of its defenders provide such an interpretation and (2) theorists 
such as Juslin and Vastfyall strongly disavow that any such interpretation is possible within their 
framework. Overall, it seems that DID is at least empirically superfluous, since the mechanisms 
underpinning MEE can be explained and categorized within a range of well-regarded theoretical 
frameworks without positing any such distinction. Further, given the serious complications that 
arise when DID is given a more detailed articulation, it seems we are justified in going further 
and claiming that DID is empirically unwarranted. 
Having made a case that DID is empirically unwarranted, I will further argue that it is ques-
tion-begging. I argue that DID serves merely as a means to rule out evidence that is problematic 
for MEE skeptics. For example, DID allows them to declare that emotions elicited through 
memory associations aren’t genuine MEE. What makes this move question-begging is the fact 
that there is no independent rationale for making such a distinction: its sole function is to rule out 
evidence that is damaging to the view of the MEE skeptics. 
As will be shown in Chapter 3, the empirical evidence suggesting that cognitive appraisals 
and episodic memory can generate emotional responses to music is compelling and is acknowl-
edged by MEE skeptics. Episodic memory in particular seems to be a relatively common elicita-
tion mechanism (Juslin & Vastfyall, 2008). Consequently, a means of discounting these mecha-
nisms is of vital importance if MEE skepticism is to be tenable. Doing so on the grounds that any 
emotions elicited via appraisals or memory aren’t really MEE, or declaring them ‘bizarre and 
idiosyncratic’ (as Kivy does), serves exactly this function. Nevertheless, there seems to be scant 
independent motivation for such a move: the empirical case for DID has been shown to be deep-
ly problematic, and none of the MEE skeptics provide any alternative justification for its intro-
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duction. Thus, the MEE skeptics defend their position by appeal to a distinction that functions 
solely as a way of ruling out evidence that harms their position. Consequently, DID is being used 
in a question-begging manner.  
In this section I have attempted to show that DID is highly problematic on both empirical and 
theoretical grounds. As a result, the use of DID by MEE skeptics is called into question. More 
concretely, if DID is rejected then defenders of MEE can once again appeal to episodic memory 
associations, cognitive appraisals and so forth as mechanisms that can elicit MEE. Given the 
wealth of empirical evidence supporting the existence of these mechanisms (which will be sur-
veyed in Chapter 3), the flaws of DID significantly strengthen the case for MEE. In the next sec-
tions of this chapter I will address the remaining a priori arguments made by MEE skeptics, fo-
cusing on those offered by Kivy and Zangwill. 
2.5 The idiosyncrasy of associations – Kivy’s a priori critiques 
Kivy (1989, 1999) argues that music cannot elicit emotions: when people say that music makes 
them feel happy or sad, they are simply mistaken. In other words, Kivy has an ‘error theory’ re-
garding MEE. He argues that music has the power to move us, but that being moved is not the 
same thing as having an MEE. An example of ‘being moved’ in Kivy’s sense would be being 
awed by the complexity of a passage or stunned by the novelty of a chord progression. While 
both awe and being stunned are emotions, Kivy’s claim is that such emotions are being elicited 
by complexity or novelty, rather than by the music itself, and thus do not qualify as MEE. This 
claim seems to be underpinned by a variant of DID, and as such is problematic for the reasons 
outlined in the previous section. 
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According to Kivy, we consciously appraise the music as having certain properties and 
respond with an aesthetic judgment, though Kivy never gives a definition of such judgments or 
explains how they differ from emotions. Kivy has four arguments for his error theory: two are 
best understood as a priori while the others are a posteriori. In this chapter I will address his a 
priori arguments. 
Kivy offers two a priori arguments against MEE. The first of these rests on the idea that 
particular emotions such as fear are typically caused by certain kinds of beliefs. For example, 
Kivy would argue that fear of an object or event is caused by the belief that it is threatening. 
Kivy argues that music ‘provides no opportunities, except in bizarre and idiosyncratic ways...for 
the formation of such beliefs’ (Kivy, 1989, p. 156). Consequently, Kivy holds that whatever is 
being elicited by music cannot be an emotion, since it lacks this supposedly essential feature. For 
example, when we say music makes us feel sad we do not believe that the music has caused us to 
suffer a loss, which would be required given Kivy’s theory of emotions. We can standardize 
Kivy’s argument as follows, leaving aside the ‘bizarre and idiosyncratic’ proviso for now:27 
(1) Emotions are always caused by certain kinds of beliefs. 
(2) Music cannot cause the relevant kinds of beliefs in humans. 
Therefore, 
 (3) Music cannot elicit emotions. 
The flaw in Kivy’s argument lies in premise (1): if we interpret ‘belief’ as requiring some degree 
of conscious access, as Kivy seems to do, then then the premise is false, since phenomena such 
                                                
27 The ‘bizarre and idiosyncratic’ proviso is intended primarily to apply to cases involving what Juslin & 
Vastfyall would call ‘cognitive appraisal’. An example of this type of appraisal would be when my neigh-
bors’ playing loud music prevents me from sleeping. Kivy views any emotions elicited as being not 
caused by the music qua music, and thus not qualifying as MEE. 
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as ‘blindfright’ strongly suggest that emotions can be elicited in the absence of any relevant be-
liefs.28 At the same time, we can accept that emotions are often caused by certain kinds of be-
liefs, or that such beliefs are a common component of emotions. This would simply mean that 
MEE are unusual insofar as they do not involve such beliefs. Since there appear to be clear coun-
ter-examples to (1), Kivy’s argument is in danger of collapsing. 
Kivy might respond by suggesting that cases such as blindfright can still be accommodated 
by (1) so long as we are willing to extend the notion of ‘belief’ to include subconscious respons-
es to masked stimuli. Kivy could claim that the subjects in blindfright experiments do have a be-
lief that an image (e.g., of a spider) is threatening, but the belief is completely subconscious and 
unreportable.29 The defender of MEE might reply that if we are willing to posit subconscious be-
liefs in the case of blindfright, we could also posit such beliefs in the case of MEE, thus putting 
pressure on premise (2). Since such unconscious beliefs are (by definition) unreportable, it is un-
clear how Kivy could rule them out.  
Nevertheless, it seems there is a viable line of defense open to Kivy: he could argue that spi-
ders and snakes are dangerous to humans, and consequently images of them are capable of acti-
vating a ‘quick and dirty’ fear elicitation mechanism using subconscious beliefs (LeDoux, 1998). 
By contrast, music is simply not the type of thing that could elicit these kinds of subconscious 
beliefs, since music is not dangerous and thus not automatically perceived as threatening. 
                                                
28 For a definition of ‘blindfright’, see footnote on page 14. Further evidence for the existence of emotion 
in the absence of conscious beliefs is provided by Winkielman & Berridge (2004). 
29 We might worry at this point that the notion of an ‘unconscious belief’ is somehow contradictory or 
conceptually confused. While this worry seems reasonable, we can perhaps sidestep it by substituting the 
word ‘judgment’ or ‘appraisal’ for ‘belief’: I assume here that Kivy would be willing to adjust his termi-
nology. With this proviso, I shall continue to use the term ‘belief’ for simplicity’s sake. 
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The defender of MEE might reply to this move in two ways: firstly, she might note that cer-
tain acoustic phenomena such as dissonance and rapid amplitude increases are in fact quickly 
and automatically perceived as threatening. For example, Juslin and Vastfyall’s ‘brain stem re-
flex’ mechanism seems capable of eliciting negative emotional responses, including physiologi-
cal and behavioral responses typical of fear. Furthermore, it seems possible that, due to the large-
ly subcortical underpinnings of this process, auditory masking could in theory be used to elicit 
these emotional responses without any conscious awareness of the stimulus.30 If this were the 
case, then Kivy’s premise (2) would be falsified even if he tried to extend ‘belief’ to include sub-
conscious processes. 
Secondly, and perhaps more decisively, the defender of MEE could note that avoiding cases 
such as blindfright by extending ‘belief’ in this way would be a prime example of what Scaranti-
no (2010) calls ‘The Elastic Strategy’. This strategy involves stretching the meaning of ‘belief’ 
(or ‘judgment’ or ‘appraisal’) in an ad hoc manner to accommodate problem cases such as 
blindfright. Scarantino argues that this strategy is ultimately unfruitful, as it renders the overarch-
ing theory at worst unfalsifiable and at best trivially true (Scarantino, 2010, p. 742). If Kivy is 
willing to extend the term ‘belief’ in an unprincipled manner simply to address problem cases, 
then his theory of emotions ceases to be informative, and furthermore it’s hard to see how it 
could ever be falsified. Thus, it seems Kivy cannot simply adjust the boundaries of ‘belief’ in 
order to save premise (1): as a result, his first a priori argument becomes unpersuasive. 
To lay the groundwork for his second a priori argument against MEE, Kivy asserts that ‘the 
only really plausible account’ of MEE involves them being generated solely through individual 
                                                
30 To my knowledge this prediction has not been tested empirically, so it would seem to offer an interest-
ing avenue for future research. 
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memory associations (Kivy, 1989, p. 157).31 For example, I could hear a song that makes me 
think of a loved one who has passed away; this memory could then lead to a strong feeling of 
nostalgia. Kivy holds that emotions generated in this way ‘are irrelevant to the real expressive 
character of the music and are the result of personal associations: what I above called the bizarre 
and idiosyncratic’ (ibid.). When music evokes a memory that in turn elicits an emotion, Kivy ar-
gues it would be misleading to call this emotion a MEE, since the elicitation depends on idiosyn-
cratic associations. We might standardize Kivy’s argument as follows: 
(1) The only really plausible account of MEE posits a single elicitation mechanism, namely 
memory associations. 
(2) Memory associations are bizarre and idiosyncratic. 
(3) Bizarre and idiosyncratic mechanisms cannot generate genuine MEE. 
Therefore, 
 (4) Genuine MEE do not exist. 
While Kivy delivers this argument elegantly, its flaws are readily apparent. Both (1) and (2) are 
straightforwardly false, and the distinction between ‘bizarre and idiosyncratic’ and normal mech-
anisms seems dubious at best. We might start by noting that (1) flies in the face of the extensive 
theoretical literature surrounding MEE. There are many accounts of MEE that posit multiple 
mechanisms: two of these accounts have already been discussed in some detail at the start of this 
chapter. Both theories highlighted in this thesis were published more recently than Kivy (1999), 
but there are many others that were widely known at the time, such as Meyer (1961). 
                                                
31 Kivy doesn’t pick out any particular author’s account of MEE in mind when he says this. 
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 Consequently, it seems that either Kivy ignored the many theories of MEE that posit 
mechanisms other than memory associations, or else he considered all such theories not to be 
‘really plausible’. The former possibility would indicate a worrying disregard for debates in more 
empirically oriented fields, while the latter would be a bold claim in need of strong supporting 
arguments that Kivy does not provide. In either case, it seems we would have good reason to re-
ject Kivy’s claim in (1). 
Furthermore, (2) seems to be a very hasty generalization: while some (perhaps most) memory 
associations are deeply personal and might reasonably be classed as idiosyncratic, others are 
much more widely shared. For example, hearing ‘God Save the Queen’ makes me think of my 
time living in England, and thinking of England typically makes me feel proud. I suspect that 
similar associations could be found in many of my compatriots. It seems highly implausible to 
call such widespread associations ‘idiosyncratic’ or ’bizarre’. Moreover, even when the memory 
tokens in question are unique, it is probable that patterns can be observed in the memory types 
that a piece will tend to evoke. For example, there is some evidence that Chopin’s Prelude in E 
Minor tends to evoke a preponderance of nostalgic memories, particularly those relating to loved 
ones (Zander, 2008). Of course, the causal story here is potentially complicated: perhaps some 
pieces elicit emotions that dispose us to recall certain types of memories, rather than vice versa. 
Such questions might be resolved through detailed empirical investigations of the type surveyed 
in the next chapter. At the very least, it seems Kivy’s premise (2) is overly simplistic. 
Finally, (3) relies on a distinction between normal elicitation mechanisms and those that are 
‘bizarre or idiosyncratic’. This distinction is motivated by the idea that emotions elicited via ‘bi-
zarre or idiosyncratic’ mechanisms are not really elicited by the music at all. Instead, the emo-
tions are being elicited by intermediate mental states such as memories or cognitive appraisals. 
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Thus, Kivy can accept that these ‘bizarre or idiosyncratic’ mechanisms lead to emotion elicita-
tion while denying the existence of MEE. Kivy’s distinction is almost perfectly analogous to 
Konecni and Zangwill’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ mechanisms: they too place 
memory associations and cognitive appraisals into a special category that can’t give rise to MEE. 
My arguments against DID were outlined in the previous section: I hold that DID is both empiri-
cally unsupported and question-begging. If my arguments are sound, then (3) is seriously called 
into doubt, and Kivy’s second a priori argument collapses even more completely. 
2.6 The paradox of sadness – Zangwill’s a priori critiques 
Zangwill (2007) offers three a priori arguments against MEE. His first argument is that 
‘There seems to be something paradoxical about the fact we enjoy music that we describe in 
terms of “negative” emotions, such as grief, melancholy, or despair’ (Zangwill, 2007, p. 397). 
The paradox is as follows: if sad music really does make us feel sad, and feeling sad is unpleas-
ant or otherwise undesirable, why would we listen to it? Zangwill argues that listening to music 
that elicits negative emotions would be a ‘masochist’s pastime’ (ibid.). Since we are not, for the 
most part, masochists, this seems paradoxical. If Zangwill were correct about the existence of 
this paradox, it would suggest that instrumental music could not elicit genuine sadness, nostalgia, 
etc.. While this issue would not be a full-fledged refutation of the existence of MEE, it would 
certainly constitute a significant error on the part of folk psychology.  
There is a wide range of viable responses to Zangwill’s supposed paradox; I will outline 
three. Firstly, we might note that contextual factors can play an important role in music choice. 
For example, if I am already in a relatively bleak mood it will affect my music choices; I will 
tend to listen to pieces that match my mood. Music listening does not occur in a vacuum, so my 
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desire to listen to music that makes me sad may be intelligible only once we take into account 
my pre-existing mental states (Tamir, 2009). In such cases, Zangwill’s paradox is dissolved by 
noting that we sometimes want to feel sad. Music that typically elicits happiness would simply 
be unappealing or even aggravating in such contexts (Tamir, 2009). 
Secondly, phenomena such as ‘limbic contrast’ can give rise to a greater hedonic payoff 
when satisfying moments in a piece are preceded by passages that make us uncomfortable or sad 
(Huron, 2006, p. 22).32 Temporary feelings of sadness or uncertainty can play a vital role in 
augmenting the overall impact of a piece, leading to a more positive affective response overall. 
This pattern of bleak or depressing moments followed by a positive or satisfying finale can be 
found in a wide variety of art forms (Huron, 2006). In such cases Zangwill’s paradox is dissolved 
because the music saddens us as a means to a more positively valenced end. 
Thirdly, the elicitation of negatively valenced emotions is integral to art forms such as classi-
cal Greek tragedy (Schaper, 1968). Consequently, we might make a ‘partners in crime’ reply to 
Zangwill’s dilemma: if it’s problematic that we listen to music that makes us sad, the problem 
applies equally to Greek tragedies, as well as sadness-inducing films, novels, etc.. Of course, this 
response does not dissolve the paradox, and it would still be helpful to have a positive account of 
what role negative emotions play in our experience of tragedies, horror movies and so forth. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that music is not unique in this respect: since Zangwill’s paradox applies 
to all sorts of art forms, it does not bite particularly hard as a critique of MEE. Between these 
three replies, it seems the defender of MEE has adequate resources with which to address 
Zangwill’s paradox. 
                                                
32 Limbic contrast occurs when a negative affective response is followed by a positive response, leading 
to an augmentation of the overall positive affect. For example, a consonant chord is typically reported as 
being more pleasant when it is preceded by a dissonant passage. 
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Zangwill’s second argument against MEE involves the by now familiar appeal to cognitivist 
assumptions about emotion. Zangwill argues that affective responses to music cannot be genuine 
emotions because ‘the essential normative constraints on such emotions are lacking. For exam-
ple, if we are really angry, we should believe or at least entertain the thought that someone has 
wronged us’ (Zangwill, 2007, p. 398). Here, Zangwill is making a cognitivist assumption, name-
ly that emotions must be caused or accompanied by certain types of beliefs. He then declares 
without argument that this is an ‘essential normative constraint’ on what counts as an emotion. 
As explained previously (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4), this move is highly problematic. Further-
more, Zangwill assumes a fairly naive form of cognitivism that deals with conscious beliefs ra-
ther than judgments or appraisals. I have already addressed Kivy and Konecni’s versions of this 
argument: cognitivism is not the only viable theory of emotions within the contemporary litera-
ture, and as such cannot be assumed for the purposes of ruling out MEE. My response to 
Zangwill is essentially the same and will stand or fall accordingly. 
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3. Surveying the Empirical Landscape 
In the previous chapter I outlined and evaluated all of the major a priori arguments against MEE. 
I concluded that none of the a priori arguments on offer are successful, though they were certain-
ly strong enough to merit a detailed response, which has been lacking in the literature to date. 
Having cleared the ground for MEE, I present a positive empirical case for their existence in the 
first three sections of this chapter. My contention is that whichever major theory of emotions we 
support, the evidence in favor of MEE should prove fairly compelling.33  
I will then go on address the a posteriori critiques of the MEE skeptics, with a particular 
focus on Konecni’s methodological critiques. The overall goal of this chapter is thus to secure 
the case for the existence of MEE: once that has been achieved, I will spend Chapter 4 examin-
ing the implications of this defense. For now, I will turn to the most prevalent method of data 
collection concerning MEE, namely self-reports. 
3.1 How does this music make you feel? – Self-reports of musical emotions 
The most widely utilized data source when studying MEE is the self-report.34 A simplistic exam-
ple of self-report collection might be as follows: subjects are asked to sit and listen to a selection 
of classical music, and at regular intervals are asked either to write down freely any emotional 
responses they are having, or to rate their emotional responses using a scale or checklist. 
                                                
33 See Section 2.1 for a brief outline of numerous contemporary theories of emotion, as well as a summary 
of the type of evidence that each might find persuasive. 
34 In this context a self-report is a subject’s verbal or written report of their own emotional experience (or 
lack thereof). 
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The central finding of the vast majority of self-report studies is that subjects consistently re-
port feeling a wide range of emotions in response to instrumental music. Self-reports of MEE 
have been shown to be commonplace both in the laboratory and in more ecologically valid envi-
ronments such music festivals (Zentner et al., 2008). These results have been consistent using 
‘continuous measure’ techniques to monitor emotional change as a piece progresses (Schubert, 
2007) as well as long-term surveying techniques such as ‘experience sampling’ (Sloboda 
et al., 2001).35  
Thus, even in the absence of other evidence there seems to be a strong prima facie case that 
instrumental music elicits emotions: it would be rather surprising if so many people were sys-
tematically wrong about whether they were experiencing emotions! Of course, this response does 
not mean that everyone feels emotions in response to instrumental music, nor that any possible 
emotion can be elicited by such music, nor that context is irrelevant to the elicitation process. 
Furthermore, there are numerous methodological issues raised by relying solely on self-reports, 
some of which will be discussed in the following sections. 
Conflating expression and elicitation 
Despite the ubiquity of self-reports in the literature, there are numerous drawbacks to their use. 
Firstly, listeners sometimes conflate the emotions they take a piece of music to be expressing 
with their own emotional reaction to the piece of music. Zentner et al. (2000) vividly highlight 
this effect, finding a significant drop in the frequency of self-reports of emotions when subjects 
were asked expressly to distinguish their own emotional reaction from the music’s perceived ex-
                                                
35 Experience sampling involves subjects being prompted at random intervals during the day to report if 
they are listening to music and, if so, whether it is eliciting an emotion. 
How music makes us feel                  39 
pressiveness. Furthermore, Gabrielsson (2002) points out that researchers themselves have on 
occasion conflated emotion perception with emotion elicitation, leading to further confusion. On 
the other hand, even when this distinction is clearly made, roughly 55%-65% of listeners still 
self-report emotions being elicited (Juslin & Laukka, 2004). Overall, such concerns don’t fully 
undermine the usefulness of self-reports; they merely suggest that a note of caution is required 
when drawing strong inferences from them. 
Presentation biases and labeling errors 
There are several further psychological factors that would seem to render self-report studies in 
general problematic. Firstly, the demands made by experimenters may make a positive result 
more likely. For example, being asked ‘what emotions (if any) did you feel in response to the 
piece?’ may hint at the hypothesis under examination, leading subjects to ‘comply’ by referring 
to mild affective responses or moods as emotions. Secondly, subjects may believe that feeling 
emotions in response to instrumental music shows emotional depth or cultural sophistication, and 
consequently inflate their responses. Equally, the reverse could be true, with subjects seeing such 
emotional responses as ‘weak’ or inappropriate: in either case, these biases would systematically 
skew the results.  
Lastly, subjects may have difficulty in verbalizing their emotional state, even if we grant 
them perfect introspective access to such states, which is itself a controversial assumption. Con-
sequently, their self-reports may be inaccurate or inconsistent due to labeling errors. This type of 
difficulty can be further exacerbated by a ‘closed response’ format where subjects have to choose 
from a limited set of options. For example, if music makes me feel nostalgic but I have to rate 
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my emotional responses solely on scales of ‘happy’ and ‘sad’, the results may not be an accurate 
representation of my MEE. 
Overall, it seems that while self-report methodologies do have significant practical ad-
vantages, namely low cost and minimal apparatus requirements, any conclusions drawn solely 
from such data should be treated as highly tentative. Interestingly, MEE skeptics often rely on 
self-reports in isolation: for example, Konecni (2008a) criticizes the methodology of many MEE 
studies yet still bases his positive conclusions solely on self-reports. 
Nevertheless, it seems that if we want to draw a firm conclusion about the existence of MEE, 
we will need to complement self-reports with more varied data sources. For example, neither a 
James-Lange theorist nor a ‘basic emotions’ theorist would find self-report data wholly persua-
sive as evidence of emotion elicitation. This is because self-reports are intended to capture the 
feeling component of an emotion, and neither James-Lange theories nor basic emotion theories 
rely heavily on such feelings as evidence of emotion elicitation (see Section 2.1 for details). Un-
til recently, there was a significant dearth of alternatives to self-reports, but over the last decade 
there has been a proliferation of studies investigating emotions and music using physiological 
and neurological measures; it is to this body of literature that I will turn next. 
3.2 Your brain on music – Neurological evidence for musical emotions 
Given the problems with self-reports, further evidence in favor of MEE is required to make the 
empirical case persuasive. One source of such evidence comes from neurological studies of 
MEE: these examine patterns of brain activation while subjects are listening to music, looking 
for activation patterns that are characteristic of emotional responses. While the major theories of 
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emotion vary in terms of the role they give to the neurological component of emotion, most of 
them would acknowledge that neurological data have some evidentiary weight. 
Compared to the number of studies relying solely on self-reports, there are relatively few 
studies that have examined the neurological basis of affective responses to music. This dearth is 
understandable given the relative novelty of the key investigative tools (e.g., PET, fMRI), but 
even in its brief history this line of research has produced several noteworthy findings. Rather 
than providing a whistle-stop tour of the literature, I will focus in detail on a landmark study by 
Blood and Zatorre (2001).36 I focus on this study both because their results are fascinating and 
because their methodology is notable for avoiding many potential pitfalls.37 
Blood and Zatorre (2001) investigated the neural and physiological correlates of the affective 
response variously known as ‘chills’, ‘shivers’ or ‘frisson’ (henceforth ‘frisson’). I avoid the 
term ‘emotion’ here in order to avoid begging the question, though I would tentatively suggest 
that musically-induced frisson does deserve to be considered an emotion, albeit one that is non-
prototypical.  
Blood and Zatorre’s subjects each chose a piece of music that they claimed consistently in-
duced positive emotional responses in them. Interestingly, all of the subjects chose instrumental 
music (specifically Western classical music). Furthermore, all subjects reported that the music 
did not have any strong associations or memories attached to it: thus, prima facie it seems that 
the music was having its effects without any need for associative links. When listening to their 
pieces of music, subjects reported experiencing high levels of frisson in 77% of cases and also 
                                                
36 See Koelsch (2010) for such an overview. 
37 This will prove significant when responding to Konecni (2008a) later in the chapter. 
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reported very high levels of emotional intensity; they did not experience chills when control 
pieces, random (amplitude-matched) noise or silence were played. Physiological measures such 
as heart rate, breathing depth and skin conductance showed a strong positive correlation with 
self-reported frisson. In other words, the subjects’ heart rates and skin conductance increased and 
their breathing deepened when they claimed to be undergoing frisson. 
The more ground-breaking aspect of the study involved measuring regional cerebral blood 
flow (rCBF) increases during frisson using a positron emission tomography (PET) scanner.38 Re-
gression analysis assessing the relationship between frisson intensity rating and PET measure-
ments of rCBF showed an increase in activity in left ventral striatum and dorsomedial midbrain, 
as well as a decrease in activity in the left amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPF). 
These patterns of activation remained even when the control music was removed from the re-
gression analysis and in the subtraction analysis, suggesting that these brain structures are active 
specifically as part of frisson rather than due to differences in attention, familiarity, etc..  
Blood and Zatorre note that ‘the pattern of activity observed here in correlation with music-
induced chills is similar to that observed in other brain imaging studies of euphoria and/or pleas-
ant emotion’ (p. 4). More specifically, they note that a similar pattern of activity is found when 
we examine the neural correlates of humans enjoying food, sex and drugs such as cocaine. By 
contrast, the activation pattern is very different to that observed in affective responses to disso-
nance (Blood et al., 1999). This result suggests that distinct neural mechanisms underpin frisson 
and affective responses to dissonance, which fits neatly with Juslin and Vastfyall’s theoretical 
claim that multiple mechanisms can produce MEE. 
                                                
38 Increased blood flow can most straightforwardly be understood as a rough proxy for neural activity, 
though it’s an imperfect measure as the temporal and spatial resolution of PET is rather limited. 
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Blood and Zatorre conclude that instrumental music can recruit neural systems of reward and 
emotion similar to those known to respond to biologically relevant stimuli such as food and sex 
(as well as being artificially activated by certain drugs). Furthermore, this elicitation can occur 
without any previous conditioning or strong memory associations. This lack of associative cues 
is significant, as it suggests that the elicitation is ‘direct’ in Konecni’s sense: thus, even if we 
were to accept DID, despite its highly problematic features, it seems there would still be substan-
tial neurological evidence for MEE. I will turn next to the physiological evidence in favor of 
MEE: this source of data is particularly relevant for persuading James-Lange theorists and ‘basic 
emotions’ theorists to accept the existence of MEE. 
3.3 Thrills and chills of sound – Physiological evidence for musical emotions 
A James-Lange theorist argues that ‘we are sad because we cry’: more generally, they hold that 
physiological changes are the causal drivers of emotional responses. In this section, I will show 
that the physiological data strongly support the existence of MEE. Emotions typically have a 
wide range of physiological effects or components: for example, when I am angry, my heart rate, 
breathing patterns and skin conductance will all change. Although it is not yet possible to identi-
fy a specific emotion solely on the basis of a physiological ‘signature’, it is widely accepted that 
physiological evidence can support the hypothesis that an emotion is being elicited. By contrast, 
moods tend not to involve such pronounced physiological reactions (Frijda, 1994). In this section 
I will survey the physiological evidence in favor of MEE. In addition, I will discuss EMG data 
showing that instrumental music can induce facial expressions strongly indicative of emotion 
(i.e., music makes people smile, frown, etc.). 
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A major paper in this area is Krumhansl (1997), who demonstrated that the physiological 
changes in subjects experiencing self-reported happiness, sadness and fear in response to music 
were very similar to the physiological changes observed when happiness, sadness and fear were 
elicited in non-musical contexts. While aspects of Krumhansl’s methodology have been called 
into question by a number of later researchers, her findings were corroborated by Nyclicek, 
Thayer and Van Doornen (1997).39 Rickard (2004) took this line of research further and showed 
that self-reported intensity of the MEE correlates strongly with the magnitude of the physiologi-
cal changes observed. While other studies have produced more mixed results, the preponderance 
of physiological data support the existence of MEE. As noted above, these data would prove par-
ticularly useful in convincing a James-Lange theorist to accept the existence of MEE.  
Another major source of physiological evidence for MEE comes from electromyography 
(EMG) studies: for example, Witvliet and Vrana (1996) showed the presence of corrugator mus-
cle40 activity during music consistently judged to be negatively valenced, as well as zygomatic 
muscle41 activity during positively valenced excerpts. Furthermore, studies such as Gabrielsson 
(1991), Waterman (1996) and Sloboda (1991) have demonstrated that ‘sad’ instrumental music 
can consistently cause bouts of crying even in a laboratory setting. It seems clear that instrumen-
tal music can cause facial expressions and behavior that are prototypical evidence of the presence 
of particular emotions. On the basis of these facial expression data it seems a ‘basic emotions’ 
theorist such as Ekman would have good reason to accept the existence of MEE. 
                                                
39 See Section 3.5 for details of some criticisms of Krumhansl’s methodology. 
40 The ‘corrugator’ muscle (corrugator supercilii) is a facial muscle involved in frowning. 
41 The ‘zygomatic’ muscle (zygomaticus major) is a facial muscle involved in produced genuine smiles, 
also known as ‘Duchenne’ smiles. 
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It should be noted at this stage that the foregoing empirical evidence would carry less weight 
with certain groups of emotion theorists. For example, a cognitivist could argue that without evi-
dence of the appropriate judgments, we cannot conclude that an emotion has been elicited. Nev-
ertheless, it would be a hardline cognitivist indeed who denied that the physiological and neuro-
logical evidence outlined above is suggestive of the existence of MEE. There are undoubtedly 
deeper theoretical issues about how we should formulate, adjust or limit our theories of emotion 
in light of empirical evidence, but these lie outside the scope of this thesis.  
My goal in these sections was to provide an empirical case for MEE that would prove per-
suasive to as wide a range of emotion theorists as possible. At the very least, I would argue that 
on the basis of the existing data James-Lange and ‘basic emotions’ theorists both have good rea-
son to accept MEE. Having provided this empirical case, I will outline and evaluate the major a 
posteriori critiques offered by the MEE skeptics. 
 
3.4 Crying in front of the stereo – Kivy’s a posteriori critiques 
In Chapter 2 I addressed Kivy’s a priori arguments against MEE: I will now respond to his two a 
posteriori arguments. Kivy’s first a posteriori argument is intended to highlight a component of 
‘regular’ emotions that he claims is absent in supposed cases of MEE (Kivy, 1989, p. 155). More 
specifically, Kivy notes that emotions are associated with ‘modes of behavior’: for example, 
when I am angry I lash out. He goes on to claim that ‘no such consistent behavioral manifesta-
tions are observed in the concert hall or…in front of the hi-fi’ (ibid.). The argument can be 
standardized as follows: 
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(1) Emotions are typically associated with certain behavioral dispositions (e.g., I cry when I am 
sad). 
(2) No such behavioral dispositions are typically associated with our affective responses to mu-
sic. 
Therefore,  
(3) Our affective responses to music are not emotions. 
There are two major flaws in this argument. Premise (2) makes an empirical claim that is simply 
false: behavioral manifestations of emotion such as crying in response to sad music have been 
reliably shown in a variety of settings, including laboratories and concert halls (Gabriels-
son, 2001; Sloboda et al., 2001).42 Secondly, Kivy’s argument underestimates audience effects as 
a factor that might heavily influence behavioral manifestations of MEE.43 While he does 
acknowledge the possibility of appeals to audience effects, he dismisses them as ‘ad 
hoc…attempts to defend a bankrupt theory’ (Kivy, 1989, p. 156). Kivy provides no evidence to 
back up this bold claim. As Kivy himself notes, many forms of behavioral expression would be 
strongly frowned upon in the context of a classical concert: as a result, we cannot infer the ab-
sence of MEE from the absence of particular behavioral manifestations. We might also note that 
in other listening contexts (e.g., a mosh pit at a rock concert) behaviors typically associated with 
anger are very much the norm. Thus, once we take into account the relevant empirical data along 
with well-documented psychological phenomena such as audience effects, this a posteriori ar-
gument against MEE seems unpersuasive. 
                                                
42 We might wonder whether crying should be considered a behavioral or physiological response: I have 
stuck with it since it is one of Kivy’s chosen examples. 
43 An ‘audience effect’ is the impact that an audience (whether real or imagined) has on a subject’s per-
formance of a task. In the case of MEE, audience effects might inhibit or promote certain behavioral re-
sponses depending on context. 
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Kivy’s second a posteriori argument (p. 160) is significantly weaker, but I will address it 
briefly for the sake of completeness. It runs as follows: 
(1) Some people [specifically, Kivy and some of his acquaintances] never self-report cases of 
MEE. 
Therefore, 
 (2) The self-report data as a whole neither support nor weaken the case for MEE. 
Therefore, 
 (3) The empirical case in favor of MEE is unpersuasive. 
In this argument, Kivy makes two significant errors: firstly, in premise (2) he portrays the self-
report data as evenly split between those who claim to have emotions elicited by music and those 
who don’t, and he makes this claim solely on the basis of anecdotal evidence (p. 160). By con-
trast, the data from self-reports overall strongly support MEE (Sloboda & Juslin, 2001). The fact 
that Kivy and some of his acquaintances happen to self-report differently doesn’t bring these data 
into question!  
 Secondly, by moving from (2) to (3) Kivy assumes that the case in favor of MEE rests 
squarely on the self-report data. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, Kivy’s assumption is 
manifestly false.44 The case for MEE can be made much stronger through appeal to neurological 
and physiological data in addition to self-reports. Consequently, even if Kivy were right that the 
self-report data were ambiguous with respect to MEE, this fact would not suffice to secure his a 
posteriori argument against MEE. In the next section, I will outline and evaluate a posteriori ar-
guments against MEE made by Konecni (2008a). 
                                                
44 On the other hand, this assumption of the importance of self-report data makes more sense if we accept 
Kivy’s claim that there are no other behavioral manifestations of MEE. 
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3.5 Controlling biases – Konecni’s a posteriori critiques 
Vladimir Konecni (2003, 2008) provides a clear and detailed set of critiques of MEE. His argu-
ments successfully highlight some important methodological pitfalls into which researchers have 
on occasion fallen. Nevertheless, I will argue that Konecni’s a posteriori critiques are insuffi-
cient to undermine the case for MEE: at most, they call into question some oft-cited studies such 
as Krumhansl (1997). While these are significant achievements, Konecni overstates the implica-
tions of his critiques, particularly once we take into account more recent research that clearly 
avoids the issues he raises. 
The essence of Konecni’s position is as follows: ‘the body of research that purports to sup-
port [MEE] is recent and unconvincing. The actual number of relevant studies is quite small.’ 
(Konecni, 2008, p. 115) Konecni argues that the superstructure of research into MEE is built on 
limited and shaky foundations. For example, he argues that researchers often fail to properly dis-
tinguish between moods and emotions, or pay lip service to such a distinction but go on to draw 
conclusions that ignore its implications. Furthermore, Konecni alleges that the distinction be-
tween music expressing an emotion and music eliciting an emotion is often glossed over, with 
studies dealing with the former being treated as support for the latter.  
Konecni explains these failures by suggesting that folk-psychological support for MEE has 
biased researchers towards seeing support for MEE where none exists. In short, Konecni holds 
that ‘with regard to [MEE], romanticism and sentimentalism often obscure both the facts and 
their absence even in highly technical papers’ (Konecni, 2008, p. 115). Overall, we could express 
Konecni’s a posteriori argument as follows: 
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(1) The amount of empirical research directly supporting MEE is much smaller than is common-
ly supposed by its advocates. 
(2) Many of the studies that do support MEE are undermined by methodological and interpreta-
tive issues. 
Therefore,  
(3) Asserting the existence of MEE is unwarranted given the available data. 
I argue that both premises of Konecni’s argument are false, though he does raise some important 
issues that need to be taken on board by proponents of MEE.  Konecni’s position is flawed be-
cause he overstates the extent of the problems within the empirical literature on MEE. Neverthe-
less, the absence of detailed replies to Konecni’s position within the literature is surprising given 
the credible arguments and supporting evidence that he offers. 
 While Konecni’s claims are undoubtedly bold, he makes a strong effort to support and 
defend them. Through the use of small-scale surveys Konecni sought empirical backing for his 
psychological claims about the failings of researchers and subjects. While several of these exper-
iments proved unfruitful, two in particular stand out as providing important critiques of influen-
tial papers within the MEE literature. The first of these focused on Sloboda and Lehman (2001), 
a paper that deals with perceived emotional expressiveness of music rather than MEE. Konecni 
shows that a significant proportion of students and psychology professors who read key sections 
from the paper interpreted it as supporting the existence of MEE, when in fact the paper was os-
tensibly silent on that question.  
 Konecni attributes this miscomprehension to two main factors: firstly, he argues that Slo-
boda and Lehman use ambiguous language when describing the ‘emotionality’ of music. Conse-
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quently, a reader could easily misunderstand the meaning of the paper.45 Secondly, Konecni as-
serts that readers’ pre-existing belief in MEE led them to misinterpret the study as supporting 
this belief (i.e., they displayed confirmation bias).46 Thus, Konecni holds that a combination of 
authorial sloppiness and reader bias led to the misinterpretation. 
In response to Konecni’s survey, a defender of MEE might note that while a communication 
error did occur amongst a significant portion of the individuals surveyed, the majority correctly 
understood that Sloboda and Lehman’s paper had nothing to say about MEE. Thus, even in this 
particular case it seems the issues Konecni raises were restricted to a minority of readers. Fur-
thermore, Konecni insinuates that this type of communication error in favor of MEE is wide-
spread within the literature, but he fails to back up this statement (Konecni, 2008a, p. 119). Thus, 
we might reasonably reply that Konecni is giving in to selection bias, making generalizations 
about the whole MEE literature on the basis of a few ambiguous passages from a single study.47 
While the issues Konecni raises are indeed pitfalls that researchers must be careful to avoid, 
it seems he picked Sloboda and Lehman (2001) because he believed it to be a particularly clear 
case of the flaws that he alleges to be more widely present. Furthermore, Konecni selected spe-
cific passages from the paper rather than getting participants to read the paper in its entirety. 
Given this small and carefully pruned selection, it does not seem possible to draw conclusions 
about the wider literature with any degree of confidence. 
                                                
45 For example, a reader might conclude that Sloboda and Lehman provide evidence for MEE, whereas in 
fact they are concerned solely with our judgments of music’s expressiveness. 
 
46 Confirmation bias is a typically unconscious cognitive bias in which people tend to process new infor-
mation in a manner that supports or confirms their existing beliefs. 
47 Selection bias occurs when biased or unrepresentative samples are used as the basis for empirical gen-
eralizations. 
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Konecni’s second a posteriori criticism of the MEE literature is an experiment in which he 
replicates one of the classic MEE studies with a few minor methodological alterations and ends 
up with significantly different results. The study in question is Krumhansl (1997), which was an 
investigation of MEE using self-reports and physiological data. Konecni repeated the experiment 
at UCSD, but changed the introductory section of the participants’ instructions slightly. While in 
Krumhansl’s study the participants read that ‘Music is thought to have many effects on people, 
including influencing their emotions’, in Konecni’s study they read that ‘Researchers disagree on 
whether or not music has an effect on emotion’. With only this seemingly superficial change, the 
average self-reported sadness in response to the pieces (both of which were intended to elicit 
sadness) decreased significantly. Konecni argues that his results undermine Krumhansl’s study, 
which is one of the most-cited studies within the MEE literature. 
We might agree with Konecni that his study highlights an important methodological issue 
with Krumhansl’s study, namely that the instructions given to participants betrayed the experi-
menter’s preferred hypothesis, thereby affecting their responses. Nevertheless, Konecni’s at-
tempts to draw wider conclusions from this finding are much less persuasive. First, we might 
note that even with Konecni’s changes, subjects reported a relatively high level of emotional re-
sponse to the music. Several other methodological alterations made by Konecni in parallel exper-
iments had no effect on the results whatsoever. Consequently, while Krumhansl’s results might 
be less conclusive than previously thought, they are by no means invalidated.  
Furthermore, while Krumhansl’s study is often cited within the literature, these citations are 
often due to its role as a groundbreaking early study of MEE, not as an up-to-date source of data. 
Other authors have critiqued aspects of Krumhansl’s methodology, and for the most part these 
critiques have been taken on board by contemporary studies (Juslin & Sloboda, 2010, p. 198). 
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Consequently, even if Krumhansl’s results were completely demolished, this demolition would 
not serve to undermine the empirical support for MEE. Given the sheer volume of studies that 
have sprung up since Krumhansl’s pioneering work, Konecni has to do much more if he wishes 
to call the existence of MEE into doubt through a posteriori arguments. 
Overall, we must acknowledge that both premises of Konecni’s a posteriori argument against 
MEE do highlight ways in which individual researchers have erred in terms of both methodology 
and data presentation. Nevertheless, as claims about the MEE literature more generally they both 
become relatively unpersuasive: Konecni consistently fails to show that these problems are as 
widespread as he claims, and we have no independent reason to suppose this to be the case. Con-
sequently, it seems we are justified in rejecting Konecni’s arguments along with Kivy’s: the case 
for MEE seems secure against these a posteriori critiques.  
Thus far the goals of this thesis have been to defend MEE against a range of critiques and to 
construct a positive empirical case for their existence. I have endeavored to provide data that 
would prove persuasive to a wide range of theorists, thereby sidestepping some of the fundamen-
tal disagreements that persist within the field of emotion theory. In the fourth and final chapter of 
this thesis, I will draw out the implications of the existence of MEE for various fields of study: I 
will focus particularly on the consequences for emotion theory on both a theoretical and experi-
mental level. 
How music makes us feel                  53 
4. Drawing out the implications 
4.1 A limited defense of folk psychology 
Folk psychology strongly affirms that MEE exist: for example, numerous large-scale surveys and 
experience sampling studies have indicated that people regularly report experiencing MEE 
(Zentner et al., 2008; Sloboda et al., 2001). MEE skeptics largely accept that MEE are posited by 
folk psychology, though Kivy and Konecni both note that the frequency of self-reports decreases 
when people distinguish expressed emotions from elicited emotions. The MEE skeptics’ concern 
is that researchers are insufficiently critical of this folk-psychological shibboleth.  
By addressing the major arguments advanced by Kivy, Konecni and Zangwill against 
MEE, I have tried to defend the folk psychological position against its critics. I have argued that 
belief in MEE is warranted. This claim is significant, as the non-existence of MEE would consti-
tute a prime example of the fallibility of folk psychology. Indeed, while the arguments of the 
skeptics are strong enough to be worth addressing, they are often much too quick to declare MEE 
eliminated and folk psychology mistaken. In a similar vein, theorists such as Konecni often dis-
parage non-cognitivist accounts of emotion as mere ‘folk theory’, as if that by itself rendered a 
position implausible: I have endeavored to correct this anti-folk bias where possible. 
4.2 Affective responses and artistic merit 
While this thesis is concerned with an aesthetic phenomenon, namely music, it does not directly 
take a stance on any major debates within aesthetics. Nevertheless, one might wonder (with 
Zangwill) whether aesthetic formalism would be threatened by the existence of MEE, but this 
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worry would be misplaced.48 Aesthetic formalists can straightforwardly accommodate MEE by 
accepting their existence but denying their relevance to aesthetic evaluations of music. On the 
other hand, Kivy (1989) uses the non-existence of MEE as a premise in his arguments against 
various positions within aesthetics (Kivy, 1989, p. 169). If this thesis has been successful, then 
Kivy’s premise will be undermined: his arguments will require new foundations. 
4.3 Eliciting emotions in the laboratory 
This thesis has several implications for the scientific study of MEE. First, investigations into 
MEE can proceed with more assurance now that the existence of the phenomenon in question 
has been more thoroughly established. For example, there will be less need for the regular dis-
claimers in MEE articles that take pains to acknowledge the skepticism of authors such as Kivy 
and Konecni (Juslin and Vastfjall, 2008, p. 560). 
In addition to its positive contribution, this thesis highlights several methodological pitfalls 
into which MEE researchers have on occasion fallen, most notably the conflation of music ex-
pressing and eliciting an emotion. For example, the instructions given to subjects in MEE studies 
might not fully distinguish between judging a piece of music to be sad and actually feeling sad in 
response to the piece of music. Many of these methodological issues were forcefully raised by 
Konecni, and his warnings are important to bear in mind, though he significantly overstates the 
impact these issues have on the empirical support for MEE. 
Finally, this thesis notes several areas where the empirical evidence in favor of MEE could 
benefit from further development, as well as areas in which further investigation would increase 
                                                
48 An aesthetic formalist holds that a work’s artistic value is entirely determined by its form. For example, 
a formalist would say that the emotions elicited by a work are irrelevant to appraising its artistic merit. 
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our understanding of the mechanisms underlying MEE. For example, there is a dearth of ecolog-
ically valid studies that examine specific elicitation mechanisms. Indeed, the investigation of 
specific elicitation mechanisms will undoubtedly constitute a major challenge for future research. 
For example, isolating the impact of musical expectancy requires a great deal of foresight and 
methodological caution, though I would argue that Huron (2006) provides an excellent model for 
such investigations. 
 While isolating particular mechanisms is undeniably challenging, doing so would provide a 
means of more rigorously testing the predictions made by the theoretical frameworks discussed 
in Chapter 2. Of course, further difficulties arise from the fact that no single framework has yet 
achieved pre-eminence: as a result there is little consensus on what frameworks to test or how to 
test them, particularly given the underlying disagreement about what precisely constitutes emo-
tions and how to determine their presence. Nevertheless, such challenges are to be expected in a 
relatively young field. 
4.4 Concerns for cognitivists 
This thesis has implications for the wider study of emotions on both a practical and theoretical 
level. On a practical level, once MEE are sufficiently well understood that they can be reliably 
elicited, they could provide a powerful new tool for researchers seeking to elicit emotions such 
as happiness and sadness in laboratory conditions (Koelsch, 2006). This tool would be particular-
ly useful in the case of positive emotions such as happiness, since such emotions are notoriously 
difficult to elicit for experimental purposes (Koelsch, 2010, p. 131). Even MEE skeptics such as 
Konecni recognize that this tool would be a significant aid to emotions researchers, though they 
disagree about the potential for MEE to fulfill this function (Konecni, 2009, p. 705). A further 
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practical application of MEE is in the prevention of anti-social behavior in public places: for ex-
ample, since 2008 classical music has been used on the London Underground to calm commuters 
and criminals alike. 
The theoretical impact of this thesis primarily concerns cognitivist theories of emotion. The 
existence of MEE suggests the existence of non-linguistic and possibly primitive emotion elicita-
tion mechanisms that any satisfactory theory of emotions should be able to account for. Thus, it 
seems that any cognitivist theory of emotions that aspires to universality (e.g., Solomon, 2004) 
would have to find some way of accommodating these elicitation mechanisms within their theo-
ry. It is extremely hard to imagine how such theories could do so without relying on the Elastic 
Strategy (see Section 3.3). While a full elaboration of this point lies outside the scope of this the-
sis, it seems prima facie plausible that the existence of MEE could pose a serious problem for 
cognitivist theories of emotion. 
4.5 What’s next? The future of musical emotion research 
In this thesis I have defended the view that MEE exist. This defense has involved a survey of the 
relevant empirical data in favor of MEE, an outline of two major theories explaining MEE, and 
responses to the arguments of MEE’s staunchest critics. I have also briefly discussed the signifi-
cance of MEE in a range of fields. While the scope of this thesis is modest, it engages compre-
hensively and in detail with the arguments of MEE skeptics, whereas most authors to date have 
responded only incompletely or in passing. As Konecni (2003) puts it, the MEE literature to date 
‘understates the skepticism many researchers have regarding music and real emotions’ (p. 333). 
 The pay-off of my approach is that we can gain a more detailed appreciation of the con-
cerns driving the MEE skeptics, and thereby extract some notable insights from their critiques as 
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well as clearly setting out their flaws. It is my hope that this thesis will set future investigations 
of MEE on a firmer footing, as well as suggesting possible avenues of further philosophical re-
search, particularly with respect to potential conflicts between MEE and cognitivism. To con-
clude, MEE remain complex and imperfectly understood phenomena, yet it seems folk psychol-
ogy is right: instrumental music really does have the power to elicit emotions. 
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